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WATER MARKETS IN THE LOWER ORANGE RIVER 
CATCHMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 






Irrigation farmers in the Lower Orange River were surveyed during October 2003 in 
order to study whether water marketing has promoted efficiency and to identify factors 
that affect future investment in irrigation farming. Econometric procedures (principal 
component and logit model) indicate that purchasers of water rights produce lucrative 
export grapes and horticultural crops with relatively less raisin, wine or juice grapes 
and less field crops; are more specialised in production; have more livestock (probably 
liquidity factor) and have a less negative view of the five-year review period. The water 
market has facilitated a transfer of water use from relatively lower value crops to 
relatively higher value crops, and also promoted the use of more advanced irrigation. 
An investment model using Ridge Regression indicates that the following variables 
are associated with future investment in irrigation farming; expected profitability, risk 
perception and risk aversion (Arrow/Pratt). Results confirm that farmers who are 
more risk averse invest less in the future as can be expected from theory. Policies that 
increase risk in agriculture will have a significant negative effect on future investment 
in irrigation. What is significant from the results is that irrigation farmers are 
highly risk averse (down side). Results also show that farmers who feel that water 
licenses are not secure expect to invest less in the future. The latter effect is thus 
amplified as farmers appear to be highly risk averse. This has important policy 
implications, and measures should be taken to improve the perceived security of water 
licenses. This could be achieved by keeping farmers more informed about the practical 




South Africa's available freshwater resources are fast becoming fully 
appropriated and under stress. As the building of more dams is prohibitive, 
attention has shifted towards demand management strategies. One such 
strategy is water marketing, as water is transferred to its highest valued use, 
while the market attaches an opportunity cost to water, which in turn provides 
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incentives for conservation. Several recent studies recommended the 
strengthening and support for water markets in South Africa (Conradie, 2002; 
Louw, 2001; Bate et al, 1999; Armitage, 1999; Mirrelees et al, 1994). 
 
In the present study, the water market in the Lower Orange River is studied as 
the area has an active water market. This study links up with a study on water 
marketing in the Lower Orange River undertaken during 1997 by Armitage 
(1999). The dynamic water market situation can be studied by comparing the 
current study (2004) to the previous study. Farmers at the time of the previous 
study (1997) were concerned about the application of the proposed National 
Water Act (No 36 of 1998). When Armitage undertook this research, water 
marketing in the Lower Orange River came to a standstill. 
 
The current study has the following objectives: 
(a)  Are efficiency objectives envisaged in 1999 (Armitage, 1999 study) 
realised? The purpose would be to assess whether water marketing has 
promoted efficiency. This will be studied by comparing who are buying 
and who are selling water. 
(b)  To study trends in the water market. 
(c)  T o  s t u d y  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  f u t u r e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  i r r i g a t i o n  f a r m i n g .  
Interest would also be focussed on farmers’ perception of the security of 
the licence and the risk aversion of the farmer.  
 
For the purpose of this study, farmers along the Lower Orange River near 
Kakamas and Boegoeberg who purchased or sold water rights were 
interviewed during October 2003. Data were analysed using Logit Regression, 
Ridge Regression and Principal Component Analysis. 
 
2.  TRADING OF WATER UNDER THE NATIONAL WATER ACT 
(NWA)  
The transformation process from the old approach (prior to the NWA 36 of 
1998) to the application of the NWA of 1998 involves declaring water use as 
practised under the old Act as an existing lawful use. The process requires 
steps such as the verification of existing lawful use in order to issue a license 
either in terms of a compulsory licensing procedure or an ad hoc procedure. It 
may take time to issue licenses and in the interim an existing license is not a 
prerequisite for a water market as the existing lawful use of water may be 
traded. Existing lawful use is defined in section 32 of the NWA and refers to 
water use which has taken place during a period of two years prior to the 




discontinued and contemplated use that do not fall within the two year period to 
be declared existing lawful water use. The implication for the study is that some 
sleeper water rights may still be declared as lawful use and may thus be traded. 
Temporary and permanent transfers of water entitlements are provided for in 
terms of section 25 of the NWA 36 of 1998. A temporary transfer of water may 
be authorised for irrigation either on the same property for a different use, or 
to another property for the same or a similar use. In general, temporary 
transfers will be for one year only, with the option of applying for an extension 
of a further year. Users must apply to the water management institution that 
has jurisdiction in the area for permission to effect the transfer (RSA, 2002; 
Government Gazette, 1998).  
A permanent transfer of water may be effected by one user offering to surrender 
all or part of an allocation to facilitate a licence application by another user. 
Transfers of this nature constitute trade in water use authorisations, which may 
be used to increase the efficiency of water use by moving water from lower to 
higher value uses, or may increase equity of access to water (RSA, 2002). 
 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND STATISTICAL 
PROCEDURES 
 
Special attention is given to the theoretical measurement of risk, as it is 
important to the study. In the interest of space, econometric procedures (apart 
from Ridge Regression) will not be discussed and the interested reader is 
referred to the following econometric sources that have further bearing on the 
research in this paper: Principal Component Analysis (Jolliffe, 1986; 
Nieuwoudt, 1977:78) and Logistic Regression (Gujarati, 1995:554, 556). The 
present study links up with Armitage’s (1999) study in the same area. 
 
3.1 Economic  theoretical  considerations 
 
The economic theoretical model was based on the hypothesis that water will 
be transferred from farmers who have a low return per unit of water because 
of climatic or soil conditions to farmers who are able to achieve a higher 
return. In a water market, water will have an opportunity cost so both buyers 
and sellers are expected to adopt water conservation technologies although 
buyers may be more frugal as the opportunity cost they face may be slightly 
higher due to transaction cost. No international study of factors associated 
with buyers or sellers of water could be found probably because water 
markets need no justification in a country such as the USA where they have 
been operating for more than a century. A second objective of the study was to 




irrigation farming. It was hypothesised that future investment will depend on 
expected income, risk, risk aversion and liquidity. For more on factors that may 
be considered in an investment model the reader is referred to Landsburg (1992).  
 
3.2  Risk and risk aversion 
 
It is hypothesised that investment decisions are influenced by risk behaviour 
of the individual. This is especially true in a situation of high risk and 
uncertainty as is experienced in the study area. The risk aversion of farmers 
included in the survey was measured using the Arrow/Pratt Absolute Risk 
Aversion Coefficient (APAR). The APAR is defined as –U’’(x)/U’(x) where 
U’’(x) and U’(x) is the second and first derivative of a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, U(x). In the study the negative exponential 
utility function, U(x)=-exp{-λx} is assumed for simplicity as it has  a constant 
APAR (λ). This utility function is estimated in this study by asking farmers 
two questions relating to a hypothetical situation where they were faced with 
two options in each question. In both questions, the farmer had to choose 
between an amount dependent on the results of a coin toss, and another 
amount with certainty. The certain amount was then adjusted until a level was 
reached where the farmer was indifferent between the two choices. A farmer is 
risk neutral if the certain amount selected equalled the expected income of the 
coin toss gamble. For the first question, the gamble was an equal probability of 
earning R1,000,000 and zero (p=0.5), with an expected income of R500,000. The 
second question gamble was an equal probability of earning R800,000 and 
losing R200,000 (p=0.5), with an expected income of R300,000. 
Although APAR has been extensively quoted in literature, it has a major 
w e a k n e s s  i n  t h a t  i t  c a n n o t  b e  c o m p a r e d  b e t w e e n  d i f f e r e n t  s t u d i e s  a s  t h e  
coefficient depends on the scale and range of the data. Nieuwoudt and Hoag 
(1993) suggested that the coefficient be standardised, a procedure followed by 
Ferrer (1999) and also adopted in this paper. Standardisation was undertaken 
by converting the distribution (xmin ≤  x ≤  xmax) into a distribution (0 ≤  x* ≤  1) 
where xmin and xmax are the minimum and maximum values on the x-scale. 
This provides a unit-less expression of the absolute risk aversion function. The 
algebraic derivation below shows the sensitivity of λ to changes in the scale 
(whether data are expressed in Rands or Dollars) or range of data. 
Let x* = (x-xmin)/(xmax-xmin) (1) 
  ∴ x = xmin + x*(xmax – xmin) 
  where  U(x) = -e-λx and U(x*) = -e-λ*x* 




In this study λ* is estimated, which is not affected by the range and scale (xmax 
– xmin) of the data. 
 
3.3 Ridge  Regression 
 
Ridge Regression (RR) allows biased estimation of the regression coefficients 
by modifying the method of least squares to remedy a multicollinearity 
problem. If an estimator has only a small bias and is more precise than an 
unbiased estimator, it may well be the preferred estimator, since it will have a 
larger probability of being close to the true parameter (Neter et al, 1996:411; 
Maddala, 1992). The ridge standardised regression estimators are obtained by 
introducing into the least squares normal equations a biasing constant K ≥ 0 
where K usually varies between 0 and 1. Following Neter et al (1996:412), the 
ridge trace and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were used to determine the 
optimum value of K. This is done by choosing the smallest value of K where 
the regression coefficients first become stable in the ridge trace.  
 
4.  THE STUDY AREA AND SURVEY 
 
The Orange River, South Africa's major river, rises in the Drakensberg in 
Lesotho, where it is known as the Senqu. The river flows westward for some 
2,200km ending up in the Atlantic Ocean at Alexander Bay. At the source of 
the Orange River the rainfall is approximately 2,000mm per annum and 
decreases as the river flows westward. At its mouth the rainfall is less than 
50mm per annum. Evaporation, on the other hand, increases in a westerly 
direction. 
 
The study was undertaken among irrigation farmers in the Boegoeberg and 
Kakamas Irrigation Schemes along the Orange River in the Northern Cape 
Province during October 2003. These areas are roughly 120km Southeast and 
95km Southwest of Upington respectively. The climate over the Lower Orange 
region is harsh and semi-desert, with minimum rainfall ranging from 400mm 
to 50mm per year. This area is totally dependent on the flow of water in the 
Orange River (RSA, 2002). The largest primary contributors to the economy 
are made by mining and irrigated agriculture. With over 90 percent of the 
water use in the Water Management Area (WMA) being for irrigation, most 
attention is given to the continuous improvement of irrigation practices and 
maximisation of the benefits derived. The tendency for irrigation has been 
towards the growing of high value orchard crops and export grapes. 
 
An extensive canal irrigation system exists along the Lower Orange River. 




divides them into “inner land” and “outer land”. “Inner land” is arable land 
situated between the river and the canal and is coupled to a canal water right. 
The lowest cost method (but not necessarily most efficient method) of 
irrigation for this land is usually flood irrigation, unless the land is unusually 
steep. “Outer land” is land situated on the inland side of the canal and 
requires an alternative form of irrigation if the land is to be developed. 
Originally, water rights stemmed from the riparian rights doctrine, and 
applied to land that situated within a distance of 2,000 metres from the banks 
of the river, and within a height of 60 metres vertically above the riverbank. 
The maximum area allocated to each property was 30 hectares of canal water 
r i g h t s ,  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  i r r i g a t e  “ i n n e r  l a n d ” .  I f  a  p r o p e r t y  h a d  a n  
irrigable “inner land” area smaller than 30 hectares, then the difference 
between the 30 hectares and the “inner land” size was allocated to the “outer 
land” as a river water right. The maximum quantity of water that a right 
provided annually was determined to be 15,000m3 of water per hectare. After 
the completion of the Verwoerd dam in 1997, now known as the Gariep dam, 
farmers were given the opportunity to buy additional rights over and above 
their initial allocation. The completion of this dam also allowed regulation of 
the flow of water below the dam, which provided water users with more 
consistent access to water. 
 
The target population was identified using records obtained from the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) head office in Pretoria and 
consisted of farmers who had transferred water entitlements between January 
1998 and August 2003. This population was then sampled according to 
availability of phone numbers and availability of farmers’ time for interviews. 
An effort was made to personally interview all farmers who bought or sold 
water during this time.  
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE  DATA 
 
5.1  Characteristics of Buyers and Sellers 
 
An effort was made to interview all farmers who bought or sold water. A total 
of 37 farmers were interviewed, of which four questionnaires were unusable 
as the transfer of water was linked to the transfer of land and therefore was 
not a water market transaction. Of the 33 remaining farmers, 13 were Buyers 
and 18 were Sellers in the water market. Two farmers could not be classified as 
Buyer or Seller, since they had both purchased and sold water at different 
times. These farmers were included in the analysis as both Buyer and Seller 
bringing the total for Buyers to 15 and Sellers to 20. 




Table 1 summarises the average available irrigation land and average water 
entitlements held by surveyed farmers showing that most farmers surveyed 
held more water entitlements than their actual irrigated area. The typical 
motive was that additional water was held for future expansion. All the 
farmers only had one farm under irrigation, and some farmers had additional 
land used for livestock farming. The livestock operations have been excluded 
from this analysis. 
 
Table  1: Irrigation land and water entitlements of survey farmers in the 
Lower Orange Region, as at October 2003 (after any transactions 








Buyers (n=15)  221.8 ha  97.2 ha  137.7 ha 
Sellers (n=20)  84.8 ha  59.8 ha  73.0 ha 
 
Sellers had, on average, about 22 percent more hectares of water entitlements 
than actual area planted, whereas Buyers had 41 percent more hectares of 
water entitlements. This is probably due to the fact that Buyers purchase water 
entitlements from Sellers and are in the process of developing new land. 
B u y e r s  h a v e  u s e d ,  o n  a v e r a g e ,  o n l y  4 3  percent of their available irrigation 
land, compared with Sellers who have used 70 percent. This means that 
Buyers on average have more additional irrigation land available than Sellers 
and this could be a reason for purchasing additional entitlements. This is 
consistent with Armitage’s (1999) findings. 
 
The cropping summary of the survey farmers is presented in Table 2. None of 
the survey farmers produced dryland crops, so all crops discussed are irrigated.  
 
About 64 percent of Buyers’ land is used for export (table) grape production 
while only 14 percent of Sellers’ land is used for this enterprise. The Sellers 
have a larger percentage area (53 percent) under wine, juice, and raisin grapes 
than Buyers (28 percent). This phenomenon was also observed in the earlier 
study by Armitage (1999). In total, 80 percent of the respondents’ land is used 
for grape production. A much higher percentage of Sellers’ land is devoted to 
field crops (31 percent) compared with Buyers’ land under field crops (1 
percent). There is a small difference in the area of horticultural crops between 
Buyers and Sellers. Four Buyers grew citrus and melons whilst one Seller grew 
pecan nuts. The crop types classified as horticultural and field crops are 
indicated as a note to Table 2. 

















































Notes:  1) Wine, juice and/or raisin grapes. 
2) Citrus, pecan nuts, mangoes and melons. 
3) Lucerne, cotton, maize and wheat. 
Figures in parentheses indicate percentage land use. 
 
Crop diversification scores were calculated for Buyers and Sellers by using the 
Herfindahl index which is calculated as follows (Pope and Prescott, 1980): 
 
  Herfindahl index = ∑
2




















1 = total farm acreage cropped 
 
The scores are obtained by summing the square of the proportion of each crop 
grown. A score of 1 means complete specialization, while a score closer zero 
shows high crop diversification. Buyers’ had slightly less crop diversification 
(0.5119) than Sellers’ (0.4232), which implies that Buyers are more exposed to 
farming risk than Sellers. 
 
The types of irrigation systems used by the survey farmers shown in Table 3 
consist of drip, micro and flood irrigation systems while two farmers utilise 
macro systems. Buyers’ make most use of advanced irrigation systems (drip 
and micro). These two types of systems are used to irrigate almost 70 percent 
of their crops. A reason for this is that Buyers often develop additional ‘outer’ 
land, which cannot be irrigated using flood irrigation.  




Table  3: Percentages of hectares of irrigation systems used by survey 
farmers in the Lower Orange River, October 2003 
 Drip  Micro  Flood  Macro1 
Buyers  42 27  31 0 
Sellers  4.5 10  85  0.5 
Total  24 19  57 0 
Note:  1) Overhead sprinklers. 
 
Few Sellers make use of advanced irrigation, and use mostly flood irrigation 
(85 percent) (some levelled flood lands). Sellers usually have less land 
available for further development, or find it infeasible to develop their ‘outer’ 
land, which are often reasons for selling their additional water use 
entitlements. 
 
5.2  Trends in water prices 
 
A total of 49 transactions occurred for the period 1998 to 2003 amongst farmers 
surveyed4. Although the study was undertaken in 2003, the farmers were 
asked for details of transactions that occurred within this five-year period. All 
transactions were permanent in nature, and no temporary trades had taken 
place amongst surveyed farmers. Two transactions were excluded from the 
price analysis. One of the transactions was water traded for land, and in the 
other transaction, the farmer could not remember the price of the transaction.  
 
Table 4 summarises the transactions of the surveyed farmers. Purchases and 
sales do not necessarily match in each year since some of the sellers or buyers 
were located in an area outside of the areas surveyed. These data show that 
water prices fluctuate from year to year presumably in accordance with 
market conditions of demand and supply of water. There are two measures of 
price; one is a simple average of the transaction price, and the other is a 
weighted average of prices. The weighted average is measured by calculating 
the total price paid for each transaction and weighted by the area transacted. 
 
                                                 
4 One farmer stated that the trade referred to in the DWAF records for 1998 actually occurred 
in 1997. The approval date of the transaction was in 1998. This was consequently used as a 




Table 4:  Trading prices of water in sections of the Lower Orange River, 1997 












































































































































































     (ha) (R)    (R)  (R)  (R)  (%) 
19974  9 21 55.5  4929  - 1157  7233 4888  - 
1998  4  6 45.1  6327 3222 4064 13548 5839  50.9 
1999  5 1  8.6 9801  2106  7726  12877  10404  21.5 
2000  7 8  12.5  11552  2131  5499  14053  10425  18.4 
2001  5 3  15.6  10333  1397  9249  12717  10101  13.5 
2002  4  1 11  9276 1455 7201 10589 9424  15.7 
2003  0  2  16.8  14000  5657 10000  18000 16328 40.4 
Notes:  1) These columns represent number of purchases and sales recorded. 
2) Standard deviation. 
3) Standard deviation divided by mean (Spiegel, 1961:73). 
4) Data from Armitage (1999). 
All prices are in real (2003 rand) terms (using  CPI). 
 
The average size of the transactions was 21.19 hectares. The average 
transaction price per hectare of water (15,000m3) for the period amounted to 
R9,882 in 2003 rands, which is R0.66 per cubic meter. This is the sum of the per 
hectare price for each transaction divided by the number of transactions and 
not a weighted average. The total value for all water transacted was R8,906,020 
for 1,038.1 hectares of water entitlements, which is an average price of R8,579 
per hectare or R0.57 per cubic meter (weighted average price). The average 
transaction price per hectare recorded by Armitage (1999) was R4,929 per 
hectare, and the weighted average was R4,888 per hectare (or R0.326 per cubic 
meter) in terms of 2003 rands. This is substantially lower than prices indicated 
in Table 4 (columns 5 and 9) for the subsequent period. The average price of 
water per hectare for 1998 was relatively low compared with the years from 
1999 through to 2003. The price was fairly stable during 1999 to 2002 with a 
large increase in 2003. The 2003 figure is likely to be an inaccurate representation 
of the true market price since only two transactions were recorded.  
One possible reason for the increased price per transaction from 1997 to 2000 is 
that there has been a reduction in the supply of water entitlements as all 
additional unused entitlements have been sold. Most farmers who sold water 
use entitlements were not using the water and would not have been using it in 
future due to high costs of developing ‘outer’ land. Many farmers considering 
trading water made use of the DWAF offices in Upington for information 




DWAF records to identify farmers with excess water entitlements. In addition, 
farmers intending to sell water inform the DWAF office of their intention. In 
t h i s  w a y ,  m u c h  o f  t h e  u n u s e d  a l l o c a t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  r e a l l o c a t e d ,  a n d  i t  i s  
becoming increasingly difficult to find available unused water use 
entitlements for sale. This has probably affected the price as Buyers compete 
for fewer available entitlements. 
The demand for water is a derived demand, derived from the demand for the 
product, the production function and supply conditions of other factors. The 
implication is that water prices will increase if product prices and hence 
profits increase. Table grape export prices are sensitive to the rand exchange 
rate. This weakened during the period studied which most likely caused an 
increase in the price of exported grapes. The strengthening of the Rand 
exchange during 2003 to 2004 has severely affected profits from export table 
grapes and it is expected that water prices will be depressed again.  
Information about prices of water use entitlements is not freely available, as 
DWAF offices do not keep records of prices of previous transactions since the 
agreement for compensation is between farmers. There is also no central notice 
board that farmers can consult in this regard. It is usually by word of mouth 
that farmers ascertain prices for water use entitlements. This could partly 
explain why there is such a large range in the price per hectare for 
transactions. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) in water 
prices appears to have been declined somewhat from 1998 to 2003 (Table 4 last 
column), which is what one would expect if more information becomes 
available.   
It is difficult to identify temporary transactions in the water market since most 
are informal arrangements between farmers along a single section of a canal, 
and no records are kept of these trades. According to some farmers, few 
temporary transactions take place because farmers need long-term security of 
water for perennial crops. Farmers also have more permanent entitlements 
than used at present. These excess water entitlements are usually for future 
development, and not necessarily for insurance against water shortages. Few 
water shortages had occurred over the last 10 years, which respondents 
attribute to the Vanderkloof dam, which has stabilised the flow of water in the 
river. 
5.3.  Arrow/Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient (APAR) 
The first risk question estimates the risk aversion of the farmer where no 
unfavourable outcome (loss) is allowed (excludes downside risk). The median 




coefficient implies that farmers are risk averse. The minimum and a maximum 
values for both Buyers and Sellers were -1.18 and of 69.28 (n=14). The 
minimum value was for the farmer who bought and sold water and was 
classified as both Buyer and Seller. The next minimums for Buyers and Sellers 
were -0.40 and 0 respectively. The maximums for each category were from two 
different farmers. Three Buyers were risk neutral, and two were risk preferrers. 
One Seller was risk neutral and one was risk preferring. This indicates that the 
farmers were, on average, risk averse, with Buyers being slightly more risk 
averse than Sellers. In the second scenario, farmers are faced with downside risk 
where there is a chance that they can lose money if they select the uncertain 
alternative. Farmers are more risk averse (down-side risk) than anticipated in 
the questionnaire as almost all the farmers picked the most risk averse category. 
That is they did not pick a choice where money could be lost.  
 
The median APAR for both Buyers (n=14) and Sellers (n=20) calculated as 3.28 
is thus an underestimate. In a choice situation an estimate of 3.28 implies 
indifference between a certain income of R0.0 and being given a 50% chance 
on winning R800,000 and losing R200,000. The mean of this gamble is R300,000 
which is a significant reward for taking a risk. All but one of the Sellers and 57 
percent of the Buyers would rather not receive any amount in order to avoid 
the possibility of a loss. Faced with downside risk, farmers are more risk 
averse than when downside risk is excluded (3.28 exceeds 2.44 and 2.12). The 
effects of risk on investment in irrigation will be tested in section 6 in an 
investment model. The downside APAR was not used in the regression 
models due to lack in variability of the estimates.  
 
6. ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS 
 
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the variables was first undertaken 
as a high degree of multicollinearity was suspected between the variables 
describing the crop portfolios of farmers and variables describing irrigation 
technology used and turnover per unit of water applied. To study whether a 
water market promotes efficiency in water use, a logit model of Buyers and 
Sellers of water rights was estimated. An investment model was also 
estimated to study variables that are associated (positive and negative) with 
future investment in irrigation farming. The first step in the analysis is the 
PCA, which is used to indicate the variables that are most likely to be related 
to the dependent variable, and also with other variables considered as 
independent variables. 
 




6.1.   Principal Component of variables associated with water marketing 
 
The first three principal components account for 36.9, 17.0, and 11.5 percent of 
the total variation in original variables associated with water marketing. Table 
5 shows the loadings of the first and third principal components extracted 
from the original variables (Component 2 is not shown as it had no economic 
meaning). 
 
Table  5: First and third components of variables associated with water 
marketing 
Variable Definition  PC1  PC3 
EXPINV 
The farmers expected change in investment expressed 
as a percentage 
0.512  0.688 
TYPE 
Dummy variable: =1 if respondent is a Buyer in the 
water market; =0 if respondent is a Seller in the 
market 
0.830  0.216 
PERCEXP  Percentage of entire crop planted to export grapes  0.856  0.070 
PERCOTH 
Percentage of entire crop planted to wine, juice 
and/or raisin grapes 
-0.723  -0.081 
PERCFLD  Percentage of entire crop planted to field1 crops  -0.594  0.089 
PERCHRT 




Percentage of irrigated area irrigated using advanced 
irrigation (drip or micro) 
0.950  -0.023 
TNVWAT  Turnover per cubic meter of water used for irrigation  0.825  0.063 
LSTOCK  Number of commercial livestock owned  0.218  0.496 
CROPDI  Crop diversification score  0.509  0.204 
RISK  Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient  0.412  -0.359 
DEBT  Debt to Asset ratio  -0.272  0.058 
REVIEW 
Importance of five-year review on investment 
decision, seeded 0 to 100: 0 = no effect and 100 = 
major factor negatively affecting investment decision 
0.446 -0.253 
SECURE 
Index measuring farmers’ perception of security of 
licences 
0.372  -0.470 
PROFITS 
Dummy variable: =1 if respondent expects profits to 
increase in the future; =0 otherwise 
-0.308  0.430 
DEVEL 
Degree of development, measured as the ratio of the 
current farmed area to the total available farm area 
-0.671  -0.315 
Notes:  1) Lucerne, cotton, maize and wheat. 
2) Citrus, pecan nuts, mangoes and melons. 
 
The first component shows positive loadings amongst the following variables; 
Buyers of water entitlements (TYPE =1); percentage of cropped area planted to 
export table grapes (PERCEXP); percentage of advanced irrigation technology 




also shows negative loadings for percentage of cropland planted to other grapes 
(PERCOTH), degree of development (DEVEL), and percentage of land planted 
to field crops (PERCFLD). This component captures variables associated with 
the purchase of water entitlements and could be labeled Buyer. The second 
column in Table 5 shows the loadings of the third component from an analysis 
of the sample data to be used in the investment model. It shows positive 
loadings for expected investment (EXPINV), the number of livestock owned 
(LSTOCK), and expected profits (PROFITS). It shows negative loadings for the 
farmer’s risk aversion coefficient (RISK) and the perceived security of licenses 
index (SECURE). These relationships are important findings, which will be 
further investigated with an investment model.  
In order to overcome likely multicollinearity, a component (principal 
component) was constructed from the crop variables. A crop variable was 
chosen as the demand for water as factor of production is a derived demand, 
derived from product prices. Since export grapes (PERCEXP) fetch premium 
prices, it is expected that producers of this product will be Buyers of water in 
the market as the strong association is evident in the first component. The 
loadings of the crops are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6:  First component of percentages under crops 
Component  Variable loading 
1 2 
PERCEXP  0.899 -0.203 
PERCOTH  -0.762 -0.585 
PERCFLD  -0.601 0.765 
PERCHRT  0.559 0.352 
 
PC1 scores are higher for farmers who produce proportionately more export 
grapes (PERCEXP), and to a lesser extent, proportionately more horticultural 
crops (PERCHRT), and proportionately less ‘other’ grapes (PERCOTH) and 
field crops (PERCFLD). 
 
6.2.  Logit model of Buyers and Sellers of water rights 
The most significant variable (Table 7) was PC1 (Wald=6.8). The Wald statistic 
(which has a χ2 distribution) can be approximated by t-squared, implying that 
the t=2.6 for the PC1 variable. The t statistic has a normal distribution but 
Wald can be approximated by t-squared for larger samples of at least 30 (Ndlovu, 
2004). This indicates that Buyers of water rights produce proportionately more 
export grapes, to a lesser extent, horticultural crops while proportionately less 
‘other’ grapes and field crops are produced. The Buyers of water rights appear 




Buyers are also less diversified (t=1.24) and only use water on the high value 
crops. This captures the phenomenon that Buyers are the more specialized 
farmers (table grapes). 
In Table 7, the following variables explained whether a farmer was a Buyer or 
Seller of water rights, PC1 (Table 6), Crop Diversification (CROPDI) and 
Livestock (LSTOCK). 
 
Table 7:  First logit regression of Buyers and Sellers of water rights 
   B  SE  Wald  Df  Sig 
PC1  2.937  1.129  6.763  1  .009 
CROPDI  5.408  4.367  1.534  1  .216 
LSTOCK  0.007  0.006  1.302  1  .254 
Constant  -2.979  1.967  2.293  1  .130 
 
The Cox and Snell R-Square value is 60.6 and the Nagelkerke R-Square value 
is 81.3 percent. Cox and Snell’s R-Square is an attempt to imitate the 
interpretation of multiple R-Square based on the likelihood, but it’s maximum 
i s  o f t e n  l e s s  t h a n  o n e .  T h e  N a g e l k e r k e  R - S q u a r e  i s  a  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
former, which divides the Cox and Snell R-square by it’s maximum in order to 
achieve a measure that ranges from zero to one. The –2 log likelihood or scaled 
deviance value is 15.217 which follows a chi-square distribution with one 
degree of freedom. This value is significant at the one percent level. The 
Pearson Goodness-of-Fit chi-square is 36.649 with 31 degrees of freedom, 
which yields a p value (significance) of 0.223. This tests the hypothesis that the 
model is a good fit and should not be rejected (i.e. p > 0.05). 
The overall correct classification of the model was 91.4% while the 
classification for Buyers was 86.7% and Sellers was 95% (Table 8). The model 
was not tested on new data, as the sample size was already small. The aim of 
this model is not prediction, so this information is useful as an indication of fit 
of the model. 
 
Table 8:  Classification  of  observed  and predicted values of Buyers and 




Type Seller  (0)  Buyer  (1) 
Percentage Correct 
Seller (0)  19 1  95.0 
Buyer (1)  2 13  86.7 
Overall percentage   91.4 




According to Table 9 if the livestock variable is dropped then a variable 
capturing the short review period (REVIEW) enters. This implies that the short 
five-year review period of water rights has a negative impact on the purchase 
of water use rights. The model in Table 9 has the same classification as the 
model in Table 7. 
 
Table 9:  Second logit regression of Buyers and Sellers of water rights 
  B  SE  Wald  Df  Sig 
PC1  4.173  1.470  8.057  1  .005 
CROPDI  6.585  5.398  1.488  1  .223 
REVIEW  -0.030  .023  1.644  1  .200 
Constant  -1.061  2.365  0.201  1  .654 
 
Although models in Tables 7 and 9 have identical classification rates, the 
equation in Table 9 is a somewhat better economic model as it has a less 
significant constant term. More is explained by variables studied and the Wald 
criteria of these variables are marginally higher. Some statistics of the model in 
Table 9 are marginally lower. The Cox and Snell R-Square is 60.2 and the 
Nagelkerke R-Square value is 80.8 percent.  
 
6.3 Investment  model 
 
An investment model was estimated where Y is the percentage that farmers 
expect to increase or decrease their investment in irrigation. This regression 
suffered from high multicollinearity as measured by VIF values. A Ridge 
Regression was thus undertaken to reduce multicollinearity. The results of this 
regression are shown in Table 10. The model basically explains future 
investment as a function of expected profits, risk, and possibly liquidity. These 
variables are supported by economic theoretical considerations. Future 
investments are also expected to be influenced by expected real interest rates. 
This variable was not included as farmers may not be sufficiently familiar with 
changes in macro-economic variables while different farmers face different 
opportunity costs of capital.  
 
The R-squared value is 0.553 which is considered good given the conceptual 
nature of the model. The F value for the model is 5.15, which is significant at 
the 1 percent level, indicating that all the variables are jointly significant. A 
ridge trace has shown that regression coefficients stabilize after k=0.15 while 
the multiple regression coefficient declines only modestly before this point.  




Table 10:  Ridge regression of factors affecting investment 
  B  SE(B)  Standard Beta  B/SE(B) = t 
PERCEXP  0.098 0.079 0.176  1.237 
PERCOTH  -0.224 0.089  -0.335  -2.522 
LSTOCK  0.009 0.004 0.284  2.346 
CROPDI  18.246 11.730  0.196  1.556 
RISK  -0.216 0.134  -0.195  -1.611 
SECURE  -0.133 0.068  -0.239  -1.953 
Constant  20.694 9.132 0.000  2.266 
 
The crop variables indicate that table grape producers (PERCEXP) will invest 
more and that producers of other grapes (PERCOTH) will invest less. Future 
investment is highly dependent on expected profits. The signs of these variables 
are expected as current income per hectare from table grapes (R130,000) 
significantly exceeds that of wine grapes (R40,000) or raisins (R30,000). 
Expectations are assumed to be based on past experience. The farmers with 
more livestock are expected to invest more. This may be attributed to a better 
liquidity position of these farmers (livestock is a liquid asset as it may be sold 
during adverse conditions). 
 
The more risk averse farmers are expected to invest less as the RISK coefficient 
(APAR) was negative. This study indicates that irrigation farmers along the 
Lower Orange River are highly risk averse, especially as far as down-side risk 
is concerned. The implication is that policies that increase the risk in 
agriculture will have a significant negative effect on future investment in 
irrigation as these farmers will attach a great cost to risk. Farmers who feel that 
water licenses are not secure (high scores for SECURE) are further expected to 
invest less. The fact that both the RISK variable and the SECURE variable 
entered is significant as both variables measure different dimensions of risk. 
For instance a risk neutral farmer will invest less if he feels less secure about 
his water license. According to NWA Section 27(1)(k) the probable duration of 
the investment period will be considered in licence applications. Farmers are 
not sufficiently informed about this concession. 
 
7.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The water market in the Lower Orange River was studied to: determine 
whether water marketing has promoted efficiency by comparing who are 
buying and who are selling water; identify trends in the water market; identify 
factors that affect future investment in irrigation farming. The profile of a 
purchaser of water rights was a farmer who grows relatively more export 




and less field crops; is more specialised in production; has more livestock and 
has a less negative view of the five-year review period.  
 
The buyers of water rights tend to specialize in the production of few crops 
that are highly profitable such as export grapes. Buyers are often livestock 
owners. Livestock are seen as a liquid asset, which may be a means of 
financing water market purchases. The short five-year review period has a 
negative impact on the purchase of water rights. This could be explained by 
the fact that the planning horizons for grape producers exceeds five years and 
requires an assured supply of water for the duration of the crops lifespan. 
 
Export grapes and horticultural crops are seen as more profitable alternatives, 
which require intensive investment in advanced irrigation systems. High 
quality export grapes require heat and water, with no heavy rainstorms that 
can damage the grapes. Areas such as Kakamas are more suited to the 
production of table grapes than other areas such as Boegoeberg and water 
tends to be purchased by farmers in Kakamas. The water market has 
facilitated a transfer of water use from relatively lower value crops to 
relatively higher value crops, and also promoted the use of more advanced 
irrigation, although this is an indirect effect, since the irrigation type is 
dependent on the requirements of the crop and strategy of the farmer. From 
this evidence, it is apparent that the water market meets the objective of 
efficiency and allows flexibility of water allocations. The transfer of water out 
of Boegoeberg has no negative employment effects on this area, as the 
transferred water was not used for irrigation. Sellers are compensated through 
the selling price of the water and are only selling excess water and not ceasing 
irrigation. 
 
Transfers often result in the use of more water from the resource, since farmers 
who do not use excess water are usually the first to sell and the unused water 
gets put to use. For this reason it is important that the water resource can 
support the initial allocation of rights. In addition, it may be necessary to have 
clear rules regarding transfers of water during drought years as transfers of 
unused water will increase the pressure on the already stressed resource 
during these times. 
 
Water prices have increased gradually from 1997 to 1999 with the price 
settling at around R10,000 (2003 rands) per hectare from 1999 to 2002. The 
price data for 2003 is very thin (two observation), and likely to be unreliable. 
The water price increase is possibly due to the increase in the price of export 
grapes, which was caused by the weakening exchange rate. If this is the case, 




to a decline in the export grape prices caused by a firmer Rand. The range of 
prices experienced within each year has decreased over time as shown by the 
coefficient of variation. This is expected if more information becomes available. 
 
A Ridge Regression was fitted to estimate variables associated with future 
investment in irrigation farming. Factors which affect expected future 
investment were shown to be expected profitability, risk perception and risk 
aversion. Export grape producers expect to invest relatively more, while 
producers with a higher proportion of other grapes expect to invest relatively 
less. Farmers who own more livestock also expect to invest more in the future. 
Livestock is a liquid asset, and these far m e r s  m a y  e x p e c t  t o  b e  i n  a  b e t t e r  
liquidity position and able to make investments. Results indicate that farmers 
who are more risk averse expect to invest less in the future. Policies that 
increase risk in agriculture will have a significant negative effect on future 
investment in irrigation. Results also show that farmers who feel that water 
licenses are not secure expect to invest less in the future. This has important 
policy implications, and measures should be taken to improve the perceived 
security of water licenses. This could be achieved by keeping farmers more 
informed about the practical implications of the NWA and specifically water 
licenses. The lack of information available to farmers is evident from the 
responses obtained during the survey. The DWAF does supply information to 
farmers, and much information is available via their website, however, 
relevant, simplified, and practical information should also be supplied to 
farmers. It does, however, appear that the length of the investment period will 
be considered in licence applications (NWA section 27(1) (k)). This concession 
is not well known at the farm level and lack of information is a problem. 
 
In addition, policy makers should make use of feedback from farmers to 
enable the pragmatic implementation of the NWA institutions.  
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